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There  is a consensus  that private-sector  production  of goods and services  depends  crucially
upon  an  adequate,  well-maintained and  efficient  infrastructure of  roads,  electricity,
telecommunications,  water, waste disposal  and other similar  facilities. Electricity  and water are
essential  inputs  in the production  process,  transpoi  t and communications  are needed  to enhance  the
mobility of goods and services,  and sanitary  services  are needed  for waste disposal. Given  these
intuitively  appealiiig  observations',  what is the rationale  for public  provision  of such services? Has
the  role of government as provider of these services changed over time with technological
developments?  How should  the  publicly  provided  infrastructure  services  be financed?  These are the
main questions this paper addresses. The paper analyzes  in brief the role of government  as the
provider  of infrastructure  and  iooks  at its provision  in a few developing  countries  (section  2). Using
economic  principles  it provides  a criteria  for financing  infrastructure  services  where  consumption-
related user charges  can be effectively  levied  (section  3).  In the light  of the suggestce criteria  it
examines, by means of a few examples,  the experience  of developing  countries  in financing  the
publicly  provided  infrastructure  services  in transport  (road), water, telecommunications,  and power
sectors (section 4). Section  5 presents  a few concluding  remarks.
2.  Public  Provision  of Infrastructure  Services
An important  rationale  for public  provision  of (or intervention  in) infrastructure  activities  has
been the existence  of economies  of scale  in production. The production  and distribution  of water,
'The  evidence  on  the  link  between  infrastructure  and  economic  growth,  however,  remains  sketchy.
There  is a lack  of empirical  consensus  regarding  the  magnitude  as  well  as the  direction  of  the  effect.  The  size
of infrastructure,  the  efficiency  of  provision,  and  the  appropriate  public-private  balance  in  its provision
appear  to be the  major  issues  of  contention.  See  Barro  [1991],  Easterly  and  Rebelo  [1993],  and  Devarajan  et
al.  [19931.for examp'e, may allow for substantial  decreases  in average cost when the scale of production
increases.  In telecommunications,  tranport and power,  fixed costs are high as these sectors require
a few  large investments.  Once  the systems  are set up, output can be increased  at declining  average
costs until the capacity  limit  becomes  binciing. It is therefore  necessary  in such cases to allow a
monopolist  to engage  in the entirety  of production. If infrastructure  services  were provided  by an
unregulated private monopolist,  he would charge monopoly  prices to maxiniize  profits.  Such
monopoly prices associdted  with profit maximization  are not only undesirable  due tc  equity
consideratlons,  but they  usually  lead  to efficiency  losses  when compared  with  the competitive  market
outcome. In view  of this,  a relatively  easy monitored  producing  entity  would  then be the government
itself. In many  cases,  however,  the governnent is not the producer  of the services  but it regulattes
the prices  and  entry  in such  industries.  Infrastructure  services  such  as electric  power, water and gas,
telecommunications  and transportation are either publicly  provided or regulated (if privately
produced)  and it is typically  assumed  that the objective  of the government  as producer or regulator
is to maximize  social  welfare.
Technological  advancements  over the years,  however,  have gradually  reduced  the need for
a single  supplier  of many  of these  services  and  have  created  conditions  f *r  competition.  For example,
in telecommunications,  new technologies  such as cable-based  telephone  access,  cellular  radio, and
direct  microwave  links  to local  or long-distance  switching  nodes have reduced  the natural  monopoly
power  of t,-%  industry.  While  the provision  of local  telephone  exchange  service  still  justifies  a single
supplier as unit costs typically  fall over a large range as capacity  increases,  in the interexchange
markets the emergence  of microwave  and satellites  have made it possible  for several different
providers to transmit  calls on many  routes without significantly  reducing  unit costs and therefore,
2have greatly increased  the potential  for competition. Similarly,  while  electricity  transmission  and
distribution  continue  to justify  a single  supplier,  some  form of competition  can now be introduced  for
power generation  as development  of steam-driven  turbines  and combined-cycle  technologies  have
reduced the  scale economies in electricity generation.  Some developing  countries are now
encouraging  the private sector to construct  and operate  pc -s r plants  through  "Build,  Operate and
Transfer  (BOT)"  or "Build,  Own and Operate  (BOO)"  sci,emes  whereby  contracts  are awarded  on
a competitive  bidding  process. Further,  to increase  choice  and competition  in tr; asport  and water
supply,  some  countries  find  that efficiency  can be enhanced  by contracting  services  for operations  and
maintenance.
In developing  countries  while  the private  sector has been playing  an increasing  role in recent
years,  the bulk  of the service  provision  continues  to be in the public  domain. With a few exceptions,
electric power continues  to be provided  by a single,  publicly-owned  utility. In the Philippines,  for
example,  while  power distribution  is largely  in the hands  of the private  sector, the National  Power
Corporation  (NPC)  accounts  for the bulk  of power  generation  and  transmission.  The key institutional
feature  of the telecommunications  sector  in most developing  countries  (as is the case  of Brazil)  is a
network  operated by  a  protected state monopolist.  Domestic private enterprises provide
telecommunications  equipment and play the role of contractors in some projects.  Water and
sewerage  services  in Indonesia  are managed  by the local government.  Similarly,  in Swaziland,  the
Water  and Sewerage Board undertakes all transactions relating to  management,  operation,
maintenance  and development  of public  water supplies  and  water-borne  sewerage  facilities. In the
road sector,  while  there  are schemes  ranging  from  the use of private  contractors  to collect  bridge  tolls
(as in Pakistan)  to BOT schemes  wh',re  the private  sector agrees  to build  and operate  a toll road (as
3in Malaysia and Thailand), the  management  and provision of roads remains essentially  the
responsibility  of the government.
While  it is likely  that  future  technological  developments  will open up markets  for competition
and further  reduce  the public  sector's  share  of infrastructure  services,  it is important  to ensure  that
any  amount  of public  service  provision  is efficient. The role of financing  is critical  in this context.
3. Principles of Public Finance of Infrastructure
How should  a publicly  provided  infrastructure  of roads, telecommunications,  power,  water
system  and other similar  services  be financed  to ensure  the adequate,  well-maintained  and efficient
provision  of these  services  critical  for private-sector  productivity? Should  public  enterprises  such as
power, telecommunications,  transport and water be simply  required  to have full cost recovery? 2
Alternatively, should there be  a  flexible approach which incorporates efficiency,  fiscal and
distributional  considerations  in assessing  the desirable  level of cost recovery? What is the role o
borrowing in infrastructure  finance? Should revenues generated  from a sector be linked  to it
expenditures?  These are the issues  this section  addresses.
Cost  Recovery.  Given  that most of these set-vices  are provided at the local level and user
charges can be levied  on the services,  an argument  can be made that the cost of service  provisio
should be recovered from the beneficiaries. There is a belief that fairness  based on the benefit
principle  requires  consumers  of a publicly  provided  service  to pay for it, especially  when  user charges
21f such  a service  was  to be provided  by a regulated  private  monopolist  it is  clear  that  there  needs  to
be  at least  a zero,  if  not  positive,  profit  constraint  otherwise  there  would  not  be a private  provision  of these
services.
4can be effectively  levied.  User  charges  can  be levied  in proportion  to actual  consumption,  and where
it is di7icult  to measure  individual  consumption,  a benefit-related  betterment  levy  can be designed  to
recover  the cost of infrastructure  development.
Production  of infrtructure services  is typically  characterized  by decreasing  cost in the long-
run which  implies  that average  cost falls  as production  is increased  up to a level  often referred  to as
the minimum  efficient  scale. Beyond  that point, cost per ulWit  is roughl, constant. Whiile  a financing
plan  based on short-run  marginal  cost pricing  principle  would  imply  efficient  production 3, it would
most  likely  be insufficient  to cover  total costs. For example,  in the road sector it is unlikely  that the
pricing principle  based  on short-run  marginal  costs (usually  defined  as variable  road maintenance,
traffic  congestion  and  pollution  cost) will  generate  enough  revenue  to cover  total costs 4. In a study
of road sector charges  in Tunisia,  Heggie  and Fon [ 1990]  found  that nearly  45 percent  of the total
costs  were fixed. Sirnilarly,  telecommunication,  power,  and water systems  periodically  require  large
investments  and  this  often  results  in marginal  cost being  lower  than  average  cost for a small  scale  of
output. In such cases  user charges  based  on efficient  pricing  (i.e., the so-called  first-best  margmial
cost pricing rule) would result  in deficits  and therefore,  budgetary  transfers  would be required to
subsidize  the enterprise.  Any  tax revenue  which  the government  needs  to collect,  to either  make up
a deficit  resulting  from  a marginal  cost pricing  arrangement  or for any other  purpose,  involves  some
3The  efficient  production  argument  in this  context,  however,  needs  qualification.  In  the  absence  of a
pure  profit  motive  for  these  public  (or  regulated  private  monopoly)  enterprises  some  amount  of freedom  is
introduced  in the  choice  of method  of  production.  The  marginal  cost  pricing  argument  implicitly  assumes  that
the  chosen  output  combination  will  be produced  at  minimum  cost. In  profit  maximizing  situations  this  is
true. In regulated  enterprises,  however,  there  may  be  very  little  incentive  for  the  managers  to minimize  costs,
possibly  leading  to an inefficient  operation.  To  ensure  that  infrastructure  enterprises  produce  at  minimum
cost  effective  regulatory  supervision  and  internal  controls  are  needed.
4There  will  be a few  exceptions,  especially  in urban  areas  where  roads  are  extremely  congested.
5price distortion  somewhere  in the economy. 5
In some cases a financing  mechanism  in the form of two-part tariff can be designed  that is
based on efficient  prices and yet covers total cost. Th- simplest  version of such a tariff scheme
involves charging  users of the service  a constant price per unit purchased  equal to the short run
ma-ginal  cost and a fixed annual  access  charge  in order  to be eligible  to buy any  positive  amount  of
the service.  The total  cost of the enterprise  is  thus  recovered  by a non-distortionary  lump  sum access
charge on the users of the service,  who are then induced  to consume  in efficient  quantities.  The
pursuit  of marginal  cost pricing  via a two-part tariff,  however,  is an imperfect  solution  for two main
reasons:  Eim the allocation  of resources  that results  is economically  efficient  only  if the fixed  charge
does  not cause  any  potential  consumers  to drop  out of the market and prefer  no purchases  at all;  and
second,  it is appropriate  if distribution  considerations  are unimportant  as the fixed  part of the tariff
is essentially  a regressive  head  tax.  The case  of elecricity provision  in the white  municipalities  in
South Africa, however, illustrates  that such a financing  principle  can be successfully  adopted if
distributional issues are not of concern. Roodeport, a white .nunicipality  located in the Central
Witwatersrand  Region,  purchases  electricity  in bulk from Eskom,  South Africa's  national  electric
utility, and distributes  it to its customers. Each year at budget tinr- tariff rates on electricity  are
dctermined  based on projected  expenditures. The structure  of the tariff  is based on the following
charges:  (i) A connection  charge  based  on actual cost of connection;  (ii) a basic  charge  designed  as
a fixed  monthly  charge  to recover capital  costs -- both principal  repayment  as weli  as interest;  and
(iii)  a per  unit consumption  charge  that  is closely  related  to marginal  cost. Since  there are no "poor"
in Roodeport  who cannot  afford  to pay the regular  rates for electricity,  there are no equity  features
5This  argument  assumes  that  non-distortionary  lump  sum  taxes  are  unavailable.
6in the tariff design 6. Electricity  pruvides  the !argest  source of revenue (in gross terms) for the
municipality  and any surplus  generated  in the process  is used to subsidize  other municipal  services.
Unlike the case of white municipalities  in Souith  Africa, in developing countries the
distributional  aspect  of infrastructure  finance  is an important  policv  consideration.  A two-part  tariff
mechanism  that is based on efficiency  prices and covers  total cost is likely  to conflict  with social
objectives.  Not only  is  the fixed  part of the tariff  regressive  and hence,  insensitive  to the needs  of the
poor social  concerns  require  that it may  be desirable  to apply  a "lifeline  charge"  for services  such  as
water and electricity,  which allows a  subsidized  charge up to  a threshold amount (generally
considered a minimum)  and charges  at marginal  cost thereafter. While  it is important  to create a
balance  between  the equity  improvements  and the efficiency  losses, revenue  has to be generated  in
the least  distorting  way  to pay for  these  subsidies. A financing  plan  that is based on efficiency  prices
but makes adjustments  in the interest of equity (e.g., provision  of lifeline  chrrges) would  almost
certainly  require  funds  to cover  total costs. In this context,  therefore,  the interesting  issue  becomes:
Should  these  funds  be generated  by a mark-up  over marginal  cost --  a second-best  pricing  rule -- or
through  general  tax revenues?
If ecoricnmic  efficiency  is the criterion  then  whether or not a sector should  be self-financing
should be based on the cost (both administrative  and efficiency)  of raising  the marginal  unit of
revenue  from  each  of  these sources. It is estimated  that the efficiency  cost of a 1  percent  increase  in
all  existing  tax rates  in the early  1980s  in the United  States  would  have  been  between 17 and 56 cents
for each  dollar  of extra  revenue  raised (Ballard,  Shoven,  and  Whalley  [1985]). Experience  suggests
6However,  it is expected  that  in the  new  structure  of local  govemment  in South  Africa,  equity
features  would  be  part  of the  user  charge  mechanism.
7that revenues  from  general  taxes in developing  countries  are difficult  to come  by. Although  reliable
estirmtes  for developing  countries  are rare,  the efficiency  cost of mobilizing  extra tax revenue  is likely
to be higher because  tax systems  in developing  countries  relative  to industrial  countries  are poorly
designed and implemented  (e.g., developing  countries he,  narrower tax bases and weaker tax
administrations)  thereby encouraging  companies  and individuals  to waste effort on avoiding  and
evading taxes.  Given  these facts one could argue that if economic  efficiency  is the criterion  then
public  enterprises  such as highway  authorities,  electricity,  water and telecommunication  syste -s in
developing  countries  should  not be subsidized  by  budgetary  sources  and be required  to cover a major
portion,  if not full, of their costs through  charges  on beneficiaries.
Bo-rowing.  Expansion  of (or asset replacement  in) sectors such as power, telecomnmunication,
irrigation  etc.  requires  periodic  large investments.  As a result often  there are temporary  increases  in
the spending  of infrastructure  enterprises.  Economic  theory  says  that from an efficiency  point of view
it is better  to finance  a temporary  increase  in spending  by borrowing  (after  funds  have  been exhausted
from  retained  earnings)  rather  than  increasing  the charges. Charges  over time should  be designed  to
include not only interest payments  but also depreciation. Such a financing  scheme allows the
enterprise  to carry  a cash  surplus  over  the sum  required  to meet the debt repayment  instalment  which
in turn can be used to  smooth the investment  cost when expansion  is needed or assets need
replacement.
Earmarking.  Should earmarking  of funds be part of an infrastructure  financing  policy? For
example,  if the telecommunications  sector  is a net contributor  to the treasury,  should  a portion  of its
8rever,ue  be earmarked  fo its expansion?  Similarly,  should  a percentage  of the municipal  government
revenue obtained  from taxing  the ownership  and use of motor vehicle  (e.g., license  fees, fuel and
vehicle  purchase  charges  etc.)  be earmarked  for road sector expenditures?  Economic  theory bells s
that  if economic  growth  is the objective  of the government  then funds  should  be allocated  in such  a
way that a unit of public  revenue  is used to finance  the expenditure  items which  yield  the highest
economic rates of return.  In light of this principle,  earmarking  is not an efficient  expeC  diture
allocation  policy. In practice,  however,  countries  do not always  allocate  expenditure  according  to
this  principie  even  when  economic  growth  is  the principal  objective. Developing  countries  often cut,
especially  during  fiscal  cris ,, expenditures  on nonwage  operations  and maintenance  (O&M)  which
usually  have  very high rates of return  as opposed  to a reduction  in say,  the public  sector  wage bill.
In the Philippines,  for example,  the overall  decline  in nonwage  O&M  expenditures  in real  terms in
early 1980s (since the fiscal adjustment  program)  is reflected  in the poor state of infrastructure
maintenance,  as shown by deteriorating  roads,  bridges,  ports, and public  facilities  as well  as by the
increasing  frequency  of breakdowns  of power  plants. Similarly,  in Cote d'Ivoire,  while  the proportion
of the budget  devoted  to the wage  bill  was substantially  higher during  the period of 1981-86  than  in
1975-80, the share  devoted  to nonwage  O&M  fell from 28 to 19 percent [Pradhan  and Swaroop,
1993].  This pattern of expenditure  restructuring  is mainly  due to the fact that reduction  in the
allocations  of nonwage  O&M  expenditures  do not have  the same  political  costs as a reduction  in the
allocation  for the public  sector wage bill. In such situations,  earmarking  can help preserve  critical
expenditures  and bridge  the gap between  economic  benefits  and political  indiffe 1ence. Thus, while
there is no unique  prescription  for the design of earmarking,  as a rule of thumb funds could be
earmarked for expenditure  items which  are usually  associated  with high economnic  rates of return.
9Experience  from developing  countries  suggests that funds could be earmarked  for spending  on
operations and maintenance  in general, and spending  on road maintenance  and maintenance  of
irrigation  and drainage  in particular. The Road  Fund in Tanzania  is a good example  of earmarking
finds for road maintenance.
While earmarking provides some assurance  of continuous  funding,  it is by no means a
guarantee.  In tight fiscal  situations,  governments  divert  the earmarked  revenues  to other uses. For
example,  since  1973  the Government  of Brazil  has been  earmarking  a portion  of telecommunications
revenue  into the National  Telecommunications  Fund  to support  the telecommunications  expansion
program into the less profitable,  poorer regions  of the country. The teleconmmunications  sector is
highly  pr-fitable  and pays a corporate income  tax on its income. Due to the macroeconomic  crisis
that  the country  has faced since  the late 1970s,  part of these earmarked  revenues  has been diverted
to finance  other  governmental  activities.  Although  this diversion  of funds  has deprived  the sector of
valuable  resources  and  has affected  its investment  program,  the action  can be justified  if the resources
are  allocated  to higher  priority  activities  or to areas  where  the rate of return is deemed  to be higher.
The principles  discussed  above suggest the following  criteria  for financing  infrastructure  services
when consumption-related  user charges  can be effectively  levied:
*  Before  devising  a financing  plan to recover  costs it is important  to ensure  that infrastructure
services  are produced  efficiently,  i.e., the cost  of provision  should  be kept at a minimum.  The
regulatory  system  should  be designed  to effectively  counter  any supply  inefficiencies;
*  In general,  the design of user charges should  be flexible  enough to provide a balance  of
efficiency.  distributional  equity,  and cost recovery  objectives. Such  a balance  of objectives
10is likely  to vary from sector to sector;
*  Optimal  revenue  generation  policy  requires  that the cost (administrative  and efficiency)  of
raising  the marginal  unit  of revenue  through  each  fiscal  instrument  be equal. If the financing
plan  based  on efficiency  prices  with adjustments  made for distributional  considerations  is not
likely  to cover  total costs of the infrastructure  enterprises,  the cost of raising  additional  tax
revenues  should  be compared  with the cost of increasing  prices  above marginal  cost;
*  Developing  countries'  experience  suggests  that  public  enterprises  such as highway  authorities,
electricity, telecommunications  and water systems  should be required to cover a major
portion, if not full, of heir costs;
*  Full  cost  recovery  in itself  is not an indicator  of successful  financing  policy,  especially  if key
expenditure  items have  been  reduced;
*  In designing  the equity  features  of the charging  system,  the intended  beneficiaries  should  be
properly  targeted;
*  Given  the nature of investment  needs  of economic  infrastructure,  funds  could be borrowed
at market  rates to finance  capital  expenditures;  user charges  should  be designed  to include
depreciation  and interest payments;
*  Whether infrastructure  enterprises  should  be subject  to income  taxes and whether  services
such  as telecommunications  and  electricity  should  be included  in a broad based  tax on goods
and services  such  as a value  added  tax are issues  which  are somewhat  difficult  to generalize.
Such  propositions  require  a careful  examination  of each country's  tax system  and therefore,
should  be decided  as part of the tax reform  process  of that country;
*  Earmarking  of funds  should  be restricted  to expenditure  items  which  are generally  associated
11with  high  rates  of return  but are politically  less  visible  and are likely  to be cut during  periods
of fiscal  austerity.
4. Financing  Infrastructure  Services  in Developing  Countries:  Some Examples
In most  developing  countries  public  enterprises  such  as highway  authorities,  electricity,  water
and  telccommunication  systems  are expected  to operate conmmercially  without  the need for financial
support  from the governrment.  In practice,  except for telecommunication  services,  this is generally
the exception  rather than the rule. Low and improperly  designed  user charges,  infrequent  inflation
adjustments  and poor enforcement  often lead  to major  revenue  shortfalls. The resultant  budgetary
transfers  worsen  the general  fiscal  deficit  of the government.
Transport  (Road Subsector).  In many  Sub-Saharan  African  countries  the public  enterprise
deficits  are often  the primary  source of general  fiscal  budget deficits. In Zambia,  for example,  the
budgetary  transfers  to the transport sector in the fiscal  year 1991  exceeded  K 5 billion  (nearly  $ 100
million)  which  was roughly  equivalent  to 12  percent  of  the government's  total current  revenues.  This
financial  drain  was largely  due to three public  sector  agencies:  roads,  railways  and the airline. In the
road sub-sector one of the main  reasons  for the shortage  of finance  was that road users  were paying
negligible  sums  for the use of the road network. License  fees  had not kept up with inflation  and were
low by regional  standards,  and fuel was only subject  to a standard  excise  designed  as a general  tax
with no explicit  user fee added to the price . The specific  road user charges  - mainly  license  fees,
transit fees paid by foreign  vehicles  and road tolls - were only financing  10 percent of the total
expenditures  on roads. In fact,  the road sub-sector  budget  has  been  in deficit  during  the entire 1980s.
12The transport sector in Tanzania  is plagued  with similar  problems. In 1986/87  its overall  balance
showed a deficit of T Sh 2,405 million  (over  $ 46 million),  or roughly  7.3 percent of government
current revenues. In both these countries,  the transport sector would have required even more
transfers  from the government  if the allocations  for road maintenance  were not woefully  low.
In Indonesia,  the total revenues  accruing  to government  from road users -- mainly  from
indirect  taxes  on vehicles,  parts  and  fuel,  and  from  provincial  government  fees for vehicle  registration
and  ownership  transfer  -- have  been  in line  with the level of spending  on the public  road network  in
recent years. However,  it is unclear  whether  all the indirect  taxes  levied  were designed  to recover
the  costs of road  usage. Some  of these taxes  (e.g. value  added tax, import  duties, luxury  import  tax
etc.) are levied  to generate general  fiscal  revenue  to support the government's  overall  expenditure
plans  or as part of its trade and industrial  policies. Unless  the two functions  are clearly  separated,  it
is unclear  as to what part of the taxes can be referred  to as the price  of road use. Charges  related  to
vehicle  usage - for example, charges added to the fuel tax, tolls and weight distance charges -- and
vehicle ownership  --  for example,  vehicle  licenses,  registration  fees, vehicle  inspection  fees and
vehicle  transfer  tax --  could be broadly  defined  as road-specific  user charges.
In Indonesia,  the current structure  of annual  vehicle  registration  tax (PKB)  is based  on type
and  age of vehicle  and  its engine  capacity  which  do not reflect  the road damaging  power of vehicles;
in particular,  the level  of PKB is too low for trucks. The vehicle  ownership  transfer  tax (BBN-KB)
is applied at a rate of 10 percent for new vehicle  sales and 5 percent  for subsequent  ownership
transfers.  Clearly,  these provisions  prevent efficient  use of roads by sending  wrong signals to
commercial  vehicle  owners  who in turn make sub-optimal  decisions  that increase  cost to society.
Recovering full cost and contributing  to general revenues  per se is not an indicator of
13successfiul  financing  policy  for the sector. This  is especially  true if key expenditure  items have  been
reduced.  For example,  a major reason  for the deterioration  of road infrastructure  in the Philippines
has been  the decline  in road expenditures  in real terms, especially  for maintenance,  during  the 1980s.
Revenue raised from user charges,  however,  have  more than offset  road expenditures  during  ts
period and as a matter of fact, the road sector has been consistently  makdng  significant  net
contributions  to the general  budget.
In a study of developing  countries Heggie (1991) found that  road user charges were
significantly  less  than total expenditures  on roads and in some cases  were even  less than rerAurent
expenditures  on roads  (see Table  1). Of the sampled  countries,  only in China  and Turkey  have  user
charges  exceeded  expenditures  on roads.
14Table 1
Road  User  Taxes/Charges
(Local  currencies  at  currnt prices)
Overall
Govemment  Revenue  from  Road  Sector
Tax  Revenue
Total  GCenaal  Road  User  Totl Road  Ratio  of
Country  Taxes  Taxes  Chagos  Spending  Charges  to
{A)  (%  of (A))  (% of (A))  (Recurrent]  Spending
(poroet)
Argentina
1987  29,584  2,922'  81  19  1,209'  47
(Austral, millions)  [I.1  [  1
Bangladesh
1984/85  32,900  1,600  75  25  2,088  19
(Taka, millions)  [4161  [961
Bolivia
1987  613  177  79  21  141  26
(Bolivianos, millions)  [231  [1611
China
1986  244  11  0  100  9  119
(Yuan, billions)  [21  [4701
r  Mexico_
1988  69,214  7,158'  39  5  831'  42
(Pesos, billions)  [3071  [1131
Tanzania
1985/86  19,776  2,016  88  12  1,267  19
(Shilling,  millions)  1  [6721  [351
Tuke
1983  1,938  268  13  94  115  217
(Lira,  billions)  [431  [5841
Notes:  (i)  ' Central  government  only,  b Central,  provincial  and local  government; indicates  not available.
(ii)  Road  user  charges  have  been  separated  from  the total  revenue  from  the road  sector  by crediting
the user  charge  element  with  any taxes  wtFA;h  were highe than similar  groups  of itemns  in the
tax structure:  fuel  taxs were  ignored  uniess  fuel  price were higher  thn  border  prices.
Source:  BasedonHeggie(1991).
Water.
(a) Imgation  In many  developing  countries  irrigation  charges  are so low and the attempts
15to collect them so feeble that cost recovery  has fallen far short of even moe-.st  targets such as
recovery  of maintenance  expenditures.  Charges  do not reflect the cost of production,  consumption
increases  beyond  the optimum  level  and the subsidies  disproportionately  serve  the better-off. While
total cost recovery  for any  irrigation  district  of any size is virtually  without  precedent,  it is becoming
hard to find  cases  where irrigation  charges  even  recover operating  and maintenance  expenses. For
example,  in India  irrigation  charges  recover  roughly  8 percent of O&M costs;  in Bangladesh,  O&M
recovery  through  irrigation  charges  is in the range  of 10 to 15 percent;  in Pakistan  between  40 and
50 percent; and in Mexico and in the Philippines  it is nearly  80 percent. Consequently, public
irrigation  schemes  have  become  an enormous  drain  on government  budgets  and have deprived  other
sectors  of the economy -- where user charges are infeasible -- of budgetary resources.!  Evidence
indicates that these subsidies  do not even serve the purpose of distributional  equity as they go
predominantly  to better-off  farmers  [Repetto,  1986]. This  pattern of financing  has created  a vicious
cycle:  Due  to serious  financial  difficulties,  irrigation  departments  often  defer maintenance  (or allocate
insufficient funds for maintenance)  resulting  in the deterioration  of the water system;  farmers
complain  of the poor services  rendered  and have  few incentives  to pay for it. This  is despite  the fact
that most  irrigation  departments  in developing  countries  have  the mandate  to recover  operations  and
maintenance  and  at least  some  part  of the  capital  cost. Take the example  of India  where  the National
Water  Policy  of 1987  clearly  stipulates  that charges  on water should  be designed  to cover  the annual
operation and maintenance  charges  and a part of the fixed costs. Yet, revenues  from irrigation
7An  oft-suggested  argument  is to include  irrigation  sector-based  revenues  (such  as  direct  taxation  of
irrigated  farmers)  stemming  from  non-water  charge  sources  in  examining  the  financial  sustainability  of
irrigation  schemes.  Such  taxes,  however,  are  designed  as  part  of the  general  revenue  taxes  to be used  for
government  services  which  are  mainly  public  goods  in nature.
16charges  were enough  to recover  only  7.5 percent of O&M expenditures  in 1988-89  (down from 22
percent  in 1980-81) During  the 1980s,  revenues  from  water charges  increased by 29 percent in real
terms;  by contrast,  O&M  expenditures  increased  by  280 percent  during  the same  period. While  there
are a number of supply  inefficiencies  in the service  provision,' the slow  growth  of revenues  from
water  charges  has  been  due  to (a)  infrequent  revision  in the rates resulting  in substantial  erosion over
time in real values;  and (b) poor collection  rates. Water charges  have  not been  changed  since  the
mid-1980s  in most states  and  not since  the mid-1970s  in the states of Punjab,  Haryana,  Tamil  Nadu,
and  West Bengal. The low rates and  poor collection  are mainly  due to politicians  who continue  to
favor  subsidies  due to intense  lobbying  by the farmers.  Attempts  to revise  water rates are often  Idlled
and  amnesty  for non-payment  of charges  are  frequent. Studies  in the Indian  context  have shown  that
even  if irrigation  charges  are  raised  to cover O&M  and at least 25 percent of capital  costs, the value
of water delivered  to farmers  would  still  far exceed  what they  must pay to get it.
Irrigation  agencies  in Pakistan  suffer  from a similar  fate. In the not too distant  past, part of
the capital  costs of irrigation  development  were recovered  from users  in Pakistan;  revenue  receipts
were higher  than  total  O&M  expenditure  by 13  and 25 percent in 1972-73  and 1973-74  respectively.
In recent years, however, cost recovery  has lapsed mainly  due to inadequate  increases  in water
charges. The cost recovery  was 56 percent  in the fiscal  year 1992  and falls  to 43 percent  if acual
O&M  expenditures  are replaced  by the more  realistic  O&M  requirements.  The irrigation  and drainage
systems  are now  in dire straits  due to lack of maintenance  funds. Current  water charges  are only 5
'The steep  rise in O&M  e,enditures was  primarily  due to growth  in irrigation  dpatmet  wage
bills,  mostly  due to burgeoning  staff. In the state  of Bihar  establishment  (personnel)  costs  increased  by 148
percent  in only  four  years  (1980-81  to 1984.85)  while  expenditures  on maintenae  of water  systems
declined  slightly. This  pattern  of expenditue  does  not seem  to produce  the services  in an efficiaent  way.
17percent  of farm  income.  It has been  estimated  that to obtain  full recovery  of current O&M charges,
the water rates need to be doubled  which  would amount  to less than 10 percent of farm  income.
In Indonesia,  irrigation  water supply  - a key  agriculture  support  service  provided  to farmers
-- has been  a major  drain  on public  resources  in Indonesia. The estimnated  total subsidy  for irrigation
water during  the countrys fourth  five-year  plan  (REPELITA  IV, 1984/85  - 1988/89)  was Rp. 4.8
trillion,  an amount  that  even  exceeded  the subsidy  for fertlizer, the other  important  agricultural  input
provided  by the government. Until  recently,  there was an indirect  cost-recovery  mechanism  in the
form of a small  land  tax and the farmers  were not required  to pay directly  for irrigation  facilities.
Realizing  this concern,  the government  has instituted  an irrigation  service  fee related  to cropping
patterns/systems  on a pilot basis in a few provinces  to improve  O&M. The starting level of the
irrigation service fees is at least 50% of the estimated  O&M requirements.  As part of the reform
process,  farmers  are also being  asked  to provide  labor services  and pay water association  user fees.
There  is some  evidence  that cost recovery  is higher  with institutional  arrangements  wherein
users  have  a high  degree  of control  over irrigation  distribution  systems.  In such arrangements  since
farmers can control water distribution  the risk of supply  shortages  at critical growing periods is
reduced and therefore  their willingness  to pay for water increases. In the Philippines,  for example,
farmers  participate  in communal  programs  by operating  the irrigation  distribution  facilities.  As part
of the Irrigation Associations  they are also responsible  for maintaining  the water systems and
collection  of the irrigation  service  fee.  Cost recovery  as a percentage  of O&M expenditures  has
averaged  80 percent in the 1979-89  period. Similarly  in Mexico,  decentalization  and reduction  of
the role of government  by transferring  the O&M  functions  to user organizations  have been  the key
issues  in the sectoral  reform  program. As a result of this reform  process,  water fees collection  as a
18percent of O&M expenditures  has increased  from about 18 at the end of 1988  to nearly  83 by late
1993. The government's  target is to achieve total cost recovery  of O&M expenditures  by 1995.
Relatively  high cost recovery  rates for both O&M and capital  costs are found in the United  States,
particularly  in the districts  where  local irrigation  associations  own and operate  water distributional
facilities.
(b) Water for  non-agricultural  use.
Water  and Sewerage  services  in UrbanSwaziland-. The Water  and Sewerage  Boardprovidestreated
water  to over 80 percent  of the urban  population  and manages  four major sewerage  schemes  which
serve  25 percent of the urban  population. While  the Board is expected  to operate on a commercial
and self-financing  base, in practice this has not been  the case. The Board has been experiencing
financial  difficulties  since  mid 1985 and has been  relying  on the government  to provide  budgetary
transfers. Inadequate  tariff adjustment,  poor collection,  and unaccounted  for water  are the main
reasons for the poor financial  performance  of the Board. Estimates  suggest  that if the Board (a)
improves  its billing  and collection  procedures,  (b) gets an adequate  tariff increase,  and (c) takes
appropriate  steps  to reduce  the level  of unaccounted  for water,  it would  not only recover its operating
expenses  but would  be able  to contribute  a significant  portion  of capital  expenditure.
Urban  Water Supply  in Nigeria.  Water  supply  in the urban  areas  of Migeria  provides  an example
of a system  where  almost  everything  is broken:  Access  to safe water supply  is limited  to 50 percent
of the urban  population  (an  even  smaller  segnent  of the  population  has access  to sanitation  facilities);
water  supply  is inefficient  (unaccounted-for  water  is reported  to be as much  as 50 percent  of the total
19output in some areas) and cost of service  is high; due to low levels of water tariffs most water
authorities are dependent  on federal and state subventions  for part of their operating costs and
practically  all  debt  service  charges;  and given  the government's  own  budgetary  constraints,  transfers
have  been  limited  resulting  in deferred  maintenance,  few  new  investments  and  increasing  indebtedness
of the water  authorities.  In such  cases  partial  reforms  would  not suffice.  For example,  a rate increase
in water tariffs alone  would  be met with strong  opposition  from consumers  (as has been  the recent
experience). What is needed in such cases is a complete  restructuring  of the system along the
fundamentals  of water  provision  and financing.  The objectives  of the reform  process should  include
enhanced  autonomy  to water  agencies  for staffing  and  salaries,  and  for periodic  tariff  adjustment  (with
appropripte  regulatory  supervision). Water agencies  should be allowed  to devise  a tariff system
which  allows  them  to recover  their operating  costs, depreciation  charges  and interest  payments,  and
enables  them  to partially  self-finance  future  capital  equipment;  in turn, they should  be accountable  for
better service  provision.  In addition,  the option of private sector management  of water agencies
should  also  be explored.
Private  Sector Management  of Water Enterprises  in Cote d'Ivoire. The case  of urban  water supply
in Cote d'Ivoire  provides  an example  of an efficiently  run infrastructure  service. Soden'i,  a private
company,  has  been  the supplier  of piped  water  in the urban areas  for the last 30 years. Operating  the
state-owned water supply systems within the framework  of a lease contract, the company  has
achieved  full  cost  recovery  (user  charges  cover  capital  costs and O&M)  for many  years. It has been
paying  taxes to the government  since  its inception  and has paid  dividends  to its shareholders. The
water  connection  ratio  in 1992  was 70 percent  and  increasing;  unaccounted  for water has been lower
20than 15 percent in the last 15 years; and the level of service  is close to westem standards. The
efficiency  of service  provision  is illustrated  by the fact that its average  water tariff is not higher  than
the ones in the neighboring  comparator  countries  where the level  of service  is much lower  and full
cost recovery  is not achieved.
Telecommunications.  Among the publicly-provided  infrwmstncture  services  in developing
countries, telecor:  ,n-ncations is the only sector that is profitable  and a net contributor  to the
treasury.  In telecommunication  sector the average  ratio of revenue  to cost  for a sample  of 100
developing  countries  was 1.6 in 1992. Unlike  electricity  and water services,  residential  telephone
service  is essentially  a luxury  good in developing  countries,  which  means  that there is no reason  to
have  lifeline  rates  or similar  subsidy  schemes. With little  justification  for political  intervention,  tariff
rates are often set at a level  which allows  not only full  cost recovery  but a significant  contribution
towards general fiscal  revenue. The fact that telecommunications  is a highly  profitable  sector in
developing  countries  does  not necessarily  assure  that the service  provision  is efficient  and customers
get the quality they pay for.  For example, despite being a highly profitable  sector and a net
contributor  to the public  treasury,  the performance  of the Indonesian  telecommunications  sector, in
particular  the telephone  network,  has been  below  par. Indonesias  telephone  density  of roughly  half-
a-percent  is the lowest among  the ASEAN countries  and the network  remains inadequate  with
significant  unmet  telephone  demand,  congestion,  high  rates of call  failure  and fault incidence. While
the tariff policy  of TELEKOM,  the state telecommunications  agency,  is rightly  geared  to efficient
demand management  and supporting  more rapid network development,  supply efficiency  needs
improvement.  Raising  productivity  and reducing  production  costs would  be important  not only  to
21improve efficiency  but also to upgrade the financial  performance  to enable it to  raise its own
contribution  to an expanded  investment  program. Appropriate  tariff  policy  has allowed  TELEKOM
to achieve  full cost recovery  and also self-finance  a sizable  part of its investment  program. During
R.,PELITA  IV, the state  telecommunications  agency  implemented  an investment  program  of Rupiah
1.44 trillion  (or, nearly  $ 1 billion),  which was financed  through 22 percent of its own retained
earnings,  67 percent  foreign  borrowing,  and 11 percent  domestic  bank borrowing.  At the same  time,
TELEKOM  has been making  a notable  net contribution  to the public  treasury  through income  tax
payments  (it is subject  to a 35 percent corporate  income  tax) and dividends  on government  equity.
Further,  55 percent  of its net  of tax income  goes  to the Government  of Indonesia Development  Fund
which  is used to finance  other governmnental  activities.
A similar  story  emerges  from  Brazil  where  despite  problems  in the quality  of service  (relative
to its comparator  countries)  and  structural  inefficiencies  in the  tariff  system,  TELEBRAS,  the national
telecommunications  company,  has been  one of the strongest  of all Brazilian  state-owned  companies,
second only to PETROBRAS,  the national  oil company,  in size and profitability.  Its substantial
expansion  in the late 1970s  was largely  financed  from its own funds  and it has been a net c,ontributor
to the treasury. Despite  the high profitability,  actions  are needed  to improve  the service  provision.
Among  the high policy  priorities  is the need to rebalance  the structure  of tariffs,  partly  to improve
service  quality,  and partly  to generate  funds  for capital  investment.
Electric Power.  The  power  sector  is heavily  capital  intensive  and in most developing  countries
its resource  requirements  are by far the largest.  How a lack  of appropriate  new investment  and an
inefficient  utilization  of the existing  facilities  in the power sector can have a ripple effect  on the
22economy  in terms  of low  productivity,  lost sales  and income  erosion  is 'llustrated  by the experience
of the Philippines.  The National  Power Corporation  (NPC)  is responsible  for power generation  and
transmission  in the Philippines  and has been the biggest  user of funds  under the public  investment
program.  However,  no new  power  plants  were completed  between 1986-92  despite  an approximate
10  percent  per annum  increase  in demand.  NPC has also paid  inadequate  attention  to operations  and
maintenance  of its existing  facilities  which  has resulted  in reduced  plant availability  and premature
plant  aging. As  a result  severe  power shortages  and increasingly  frequent  brownouts  are exacting  a
toll on the country's  commercial  and industrial  activities. While  fiscal  constraints  have limited  the
government's  capacity  to make new investments  in the sector, insufficient  levels and inadequate
structuring of tariffs have been the major contributing  factors for NPC's lack of spending on
operations  and  maintenance  on the existing  facilities. In recent years,  the financial  situation  of NPC
has been poor; it has not been able  to generate  enough  cash for financing  its investments.  A well-
managed  power utility  generally  recovers  all its O&M  expenses,  depreciation  and interest charges,
and is also able to  self-finance  a significant  portion (normally  20 to 30 percent) of its capital
expenditures. The self-financing  ratio for NPC was negative  during  the period 1987-90,  1 percent
for 1990, negative 54 percent for 1991 and 7 percent for 1992. Recently,  the government  has
approved  a new set of tariffs  that has improved  the financial  viability  of NPC.
Financial  performance  of a utility  could  be misleading  if financial  cost understates  economic
cost. For example,  until recently,  PLN ( Perum  Listrik  Negara)  -- a single  pubicly-owned  electric
utility  in Indonesia  -- was able  to generate  enough  revenue  to meet its operating  costs and finance
part of its investment  program. One reason  why PLN  was able to achieve  its financial  targets  was
the substantial  below-market  financing  it was getting  from the government  for all of its borrowing.
23Further, PLN was getting large production facilities  as equity to promote regionally  balanced
development  (basically,  a social objective)  without  having  to pay any  dividends  to the government.
These provisions  understated  the true cost of capital. While PLN's  borrowing  has been at market
rates for the last three years, there is still little transparency  in the manner  in which the subsidies
designed  to promote regional  development  flow. What is needed  is compensation  on a transparent
basis for any Icsses  incurred  by PLN  for meeting  government's  social  objectives.
Many a times the sector's  investment  requirements  are so high that the resources needed
exceed the  aggregate of the  sector's capacity to  generate cash from its operations and the
government's  capacity  to finance  from  budgetary  allocations.  To cope with such situations,  long term
debt instruments  bearing  terms that are appropriate  for the long construction  and payback  periods
normally  associated  with power  sector investments,  are needed.
5. Conclusion
In developing  countries  the bulk of infrastructure  provision  continues  to be in the public
domain  though the private sector share  has risen in recent  years. In view of the difficulty  in raising
funds  through  general  taxes, self-financing  of these services  remains  desirable  second-best  policy
and almost all developing  countries  endorse  it.  Experience,  however,  suggests that barring the
telecommunications  sector,  fulU  cost  recovery  is more  of an exception  than a rule. Financing remains
inadequate  with  the  political  economy  of tariff setting  being an important  contributing  factor to low
and improperly  designed user charges, infrequent  inflation adjustments  and poor enforcement.
Sectors such as water, power and transport continue  to drain  funds from the treasury  though the
impact  varies  from  sector  to sector. When  budgetary  transfers  are difficult  to materialize,  especially
24during  a fiscal crisis,  this often leads  to a reduction  in noniwage  O&M expenditures  which  in turn
results  in deterioration  of services.
Private  provision of  infrastructure services is  often suggested as  a  solution to  the
aforementioned  problems. Private  provision  can certainly  reduce  the financing  requirement  for the
public sector.  For  infrastructure services where competition is becoming possible due  to
technological  advancements,  the market  system  could  ensure  efficient  provision  and relieve  the public
sector from being the provider  of such services. However,  for services  that continue  to require  a
single  provider  due to scale  economies  or other reasons,  private  provision  would  not result as long
as an appropriate  rate of return is not assured. User charges  that reflect  cost would  be required  for
private  provision.
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